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and help create possibilities for ambitious re-regulation of living conditions in the direction
of, say, radical equality, participation, and redistribution.
J’analyse dans cet article plusieurs décisions canadiennes sur le transfert des droits
syndicaux établissant les modalités selon lesquelles les droits des travailleurs peuvent
être transférés à une entité successeure dans le contexte d’une vente d’entreprise, d’une
restructuration ou d’une sous-traitance. Ce faisant, je mets en doute une influente théorie
d’interprétation juridique que je nomme la « juridicité traditionnelle ». Selon cette théorie,
le droit du travail ne procède pas d’un raisonnement juridique conventionnel, mais de
l’application non juridique, pragmatique et téléologique de larges normes de relations
industrielles. Je soutiens que le paradigme de la juridicité traditionnelle est analytiquement
inexact et a l’effet pervers de légitimer le statu quo du régime de droit du travail d’aprèsguerre dans un contexte où son insuffisance est largement reconnue.
Pour remplacer la juridicité traditionnelle, je propose une nouvelle approche à l’étude
et à l’enseignement du droit du travail, que j’applique ici au droit relatif au transfert des
droits syndicaux. Cette approche dépeint le raisonnement juridique en droit du travail non
pas comme pragmatique et téléologique, mais comme déchiré par des conflits de politique
juridique récurrents et incommensurables qui rendent inconcluante l’argumentation
téléologique. Je suggère qu’en ramenant sans cesse ces conflits au premier plan de leur
recherche et de leur enseignement, les chercheurs et professeurs de droit du travail peuvent
contribuer à contester le statu quo et tracer la voie vers une ambitieuse réglementation des
conditions de vie allant dans le sens, par exemple, d’une égalité, d’une participation et d’une
redistribution radicales.
I.

ONTARIO SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM METRO-PARKING TO AJAX.................................... 265

II.

QUEBEC SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM BIBEAULT TO IVANHOE .......................................... 270

III.
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IV.
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V.
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IT IS BY NOW WELL-KNOWN that economic, social, and political shifts in the last
forty years have shaken labour and employment law to its foundations in North
Atlantic countries. Changing trade and investment fows leading to greater market
volatility, increased technological innovation, demographic transformations,
increased migration fows, and the declining regulatory capacity of the nation
state are all part of these shifts. Whether perceived or real, these changes are
said to have rendered post-war collective bargaining and employment standards
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legislation much less efective.1 Moreover, in this so-called “new economy,” it
is said that “corporations have undergone a process of vertical disintegration,
morphing into networks of frms and contractors whose constituent parts
change as frequently as do the workers that they employ.”2 Tis “fssuring” of
the traditional workplace—the workplace associated with the Fordist post-war
economy—has had a tremendous impact on the United States and Canada’s
Wagner Act collective labour relations model, which is based on local, single
employer certifcation.3
Legislative provisions empowering labour adjudicators to protect union
successor rights, which deal with cases where the integrity of bargaining rights is
allegedly compromised by economic transfers and reorganizations, are of central
legal and political importance in this context.4 Successor rights provisions are
specifcally intended to empower labour boards to preserve bargaining rights and
the ability to associate, bargain collectively, and strike in the face of economic
reorganizations and employer attempts to undermine bargaining structures.
Under such provisions, labour adjudicators can transfer union certifcations and
collective agreements to new “successor” entities such as a subcontractor that
1.

2.
3.

4.

See generally Richard Freeman, “Te Great Doubling: Te Challenge of the Growing
Globalization of Labor Markets to Economic and Social Policy” in Eva A Paus, ed, Global
Capitalism Unbound: Winners and Losers from Ofshore Outsourcing (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2007) 23; Katherine Stone, “Flexibilization, Globalization and Privatization:
Tree Challenges to Labour Rights in Our Time” (2006) 44:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 77. See
Marie-Laure Morin, “Labour Law and New Forms of Corporate Organization” (2005) 144:1
Intl Lab Rev 5 at 7-13; Patrick Macklem, “Labour Law Beyond Borders” (2002) 5 J Intl
Econ L 605 at 605-7; David Harvey, Te Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1989) at 159.
Kerry Rittich, “Transnationalizing the Values of American Labor Law” (2009) 57:3 Buf L
Rev 803 at 808.
See David Weil, Te Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What
Can Be Done to Improve It (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014) at 185; Jake
Rosenfeld, What Unions No Longer Do (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014) at
18-19; Katherine VW Stone, From Widgets to Digits: Employment Regulation for the Changing
Workplace (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 206-208.
For testaments to the importance of successor rights for the shape (and very possibility) of
collective bargaining in the new economy, see Eric Tucker, “Great Expectations Defeated:
Te Trajectory of Collective Bargaining Regimes in Canada and the United States
Post-NAFTA” (2004) 26:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 97 at 124-25; Philip M Schreiber,
“Potential Liability of New Employers to Pre-Existing Collective Bargaining Agreements and
Pre-Existing Unions: A Comparison of Labor Law Successorship Doctrines in the United
States and Canada” (1992) 12:3 Nw J Intl L & Bus 571; Joseph B Rose & Gary N Chaison,
“Unionism in Canada and the United States in the 21st Century: Te Prospects for Revival”
(2001) 56:1 Relations Industrielles 34 at 40-41.
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takes up part of a unionized business following privatization or reorganization.
Labour adjudicators are often faced with complex economic arrangements and
restructurings, to which they must apply broad criteria such as “continuity of
the business” in order to make adjudicative choices (i.e., under what conditions
to transfer certifcations and collective agreements) that will determine the very
structure of bargaining rights and in turn of the economy. European Union (EU)
labour law deals with very similar problems through the so-called Acquired Rights
Directive,5 which purports to maintain collective agreement and contractual
rights in cases of business sales and reorganizations.6
Tis article presents an analysis of legal argument in classic Canadian successor
rights cases dealing with the defnition of the business changes that warrant the
transfer of bargaining rights. It uses unconventional analytical methods to uncover
patterns of “policy” argument that recur across various successor rights cases and
could be used again in future cases dealing with diferent issues. In so doing,
it maps the interconnectedness of present and future successorship cases with the
hope of making this area of the law more comprehensible and easier to navigate.
Tis is my sales pitch to labour law practitioners who are confronted with such
cases. But this article is also intended as a broader intervention on legal thought
in labour and employment law, as well as an example of a new approach to
teaching and studying labour law doctrine.
Harry Arthurs, a leading Canadian labour law academic, has argued that the
rise of the new economy described above has been accompanied by the rise of
a “new legality,”7 whereby labour law decision making has shifted from a model
of ad hoc “problem solving” “in which results were measured by their positive
industrial relations consequences to one in which they are measured by their
conformity to the established jurisprudence.”8 He asserts that this new legality
ofers opportunities for employers to compromise the efcient pragmatism
of specialized labour law decision making by rendering it adversarial and
5.

6.
7.
8.

Council Directive 77/187/EEC of 14 February 1977 on the approximation of the laws of
the Member States relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of
undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, [1977] OJ, L61/26, now replaced by Directive
2001/23/EC of 12 March 2001 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating
to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts
of undertakings or businesses, [2001] OJ, L82/16.
See John Armour & Simon Deakin, “Insolvency and employment protection: the mixed
efects of the Acquired Rights Directive” (2003) 22:4 Intl Rev L & Econ 443 at 444, 451.
“Te New Economy and the New Legality: Industrial Citizenship and the Future of Labour
Arbitration” (1999) 7:1 Can Labour & Employment LJ 46.
Ibid at 55.
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legalistic.9 Arthurs’s argument is symptomatic of an intellectual trend I want to
analyze and criticize.
Arthurs’s depiction of traditional and established labour law reasoning is a
remarkably persistent intellectual approach that lies at the heart of the post-war
labour and employment legal regimes. Tis approach has an often-explicit legal
theory, the central tenet of which is that labour and employment law is distinct
from ‘normal’ legal reasoning in, say, private law in at least two ways: First, it is based
on non-legal, pragmatic and ad-hoc responses by experts to social realities; and
second, it is fundamentally based on purposive legal interpretation in light of the
telos of achieving industrial peace, advancing the public interest, and redressing
unequal bargaining power to maintain social stability. I will call this twofold legal
theory the “old legality,” by playful reference to Arthurs’ terminology, although
there are several other established terms I could have used.10 Tis approach or

9.

Ibid at 57. While Arthurs was talking about labour arbitrators specifcally (his article is based
on remarks at an annual labour arbitration conference), he expressed his diagnosis in terms
touching on labour law administrative decision-making more generally.
10. Some have called this paradigm “social legal thought,” “social conceptualism,” and
“functionalism.” See respectively Duncan Kennedy, “Tree Globalizations of Law and
Legal Tought: 1850-2000” in David M Trubek & Alvaro Santos, eds, Te New Law and
Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006)
19 at 41 [Kennedy, “Tree Globalizations”]; Karl E Klare, “Judicial Deradicalization of
the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941” (1978)
62:3 Minn L Rev 265 at 278, 309 [Klare]; Kerry Rittich, “Functionalism and Formalism:
Teir Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates”
(2005) 55:3 UTLJ 853.
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paradigm can be found in Canadian scholarship and treatises,11 case law12 and
11. See George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law (Toronto: Tompson Reuters, 2016) at 4.30
(labour relations boards use their superior expertise and consider the “policy facts” in order
to make rulings in light of the purpose of “intelligent regulation” of industrial relations);
Wesley B Rayner, Canadian Collective Bargaining Law, 2d ed (Markham: Lexis Nexis
Canada, 2007) at 84 (labour boards’ legal reasoning as more “discretionary,” “regulatory,” and
“general” than that of courts because of the purpose of setting “ground rules” for industrial
relations); Donald D Carter et al, Labour Law in Canada, 5th ed (New York: Kluwer Law
International, 2002) at 151 (describing the “web of rules” comprising “informal practices,
customs and understandings” in the workplace as a “source” of labour law); Fernand
Morin et al, Le droit de l’emploi au Québec, 4th ed (Montréal: Wilson & Lafeur, 2010) at
134, 148, 166 (labour and employment law as “pragmatic,” “teleological,” distinct from
the “strict and hard application of liberal law,” and “incessantly evolving”); Michel Coutu
and Georges Marceau, Droit administratif du travail: tribunaux et organismes spécialisés du
domaine du travail (Montréal: Yvon Blais, 2007) at para 2 (labour law as an “autonomous
social law” in which “collective rights” are paramount and as a “non-formal” and “fexible”
form of administrative justice); Paul Weiler, “Te Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative
Versions” (1969) 19:1 UTLJ 16 at 16-17 (labour arbitrators have “expertise and experience”
in “peculiar ‘non-legal’ criteria, in particular the maintenance of peaceful, uninterrupted and
fair industrial enterprise” and do legal interpretation based on “overriding labour relations
goals…in the interests of the public”); David Beatty, “Te Role of the Arbitrator: A Liberal
Version” (1984) 34:2 UTLJ 136 at 148 (the role of the arbitrator is that of “discovering and
‘working pure’ th[e] industrial, common law of the shop” which includes “sound industrial
relations standards”); Harry Arthurs, “Labour Law Without the State?” (1996) 46:1 UTLJ
1 at 3 (labour law is about the “indigenous production and enforcement of norms within
the workplace,” including customs and “scientifc” management practices, as distinct
from state law).
12. Tis intellectual framework has often been mobilized to justify curial deference to labour
adjudicators including arbitrators and labour boards. MAHCP v Nor-Man Regional Health
Authority Inc, 2011 SCC 59, [2011] 3 SCR 616 (Fish J, establishing that labour arbitrators
“are not legally bound to apply equitable and common law principles … in the same manner
as courts of law” because “theirs is a diferent mission, informed by the particular context of
labour relations” at para 5. Arbitrators “may properly develop doctrines and fashion remedies
appropriate in their feld, drawing inspiration from general legal principles, the objectives
and purposes of the statutory scheme, the principles of labour relations, the nature of the
collective bargaining process, and the factual matrix of the grievances of which they are
seized” at para 45. Tis was said to stem from the arbitrators’ “distinctive role in fostering
peace in industrial relations” at para 47); Toronto (City of ) Board of Education v OSSTF,
District 15, [1997] 1 SCR 487, 144 DLR (4th) 385 (Cory J, emphasizing the need for curial
deference towards arbitrators, who are better equipped to render decisions that are “sensitive
to the situation” of labour relations and to take account of the “basic requirement for peace
in industrial relations” at paras 35-36); Ivanhoe Inc v UFCW, Local 500, 2001 SCC 47,
[2001] 2 SCR 565 [Ivanhoe] (Arbour J, justifying deference to labour boards on successor
rights issues on the basis that their members have “developed special expertise in this regard
which is adapted to the specifc context of labour relations and which is not shared by the
courts,” allowing them to further the purpose of “promot[ing] collective bargaining as a
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even legislation.13 It mostly relates to collective bargaining, the core of the
post-war regime of labour and employment law.14 It is applied in equal measure
to that regime’s two central decision makers, grievance arbitrators and labour
boards, and it is sometimes also put forward as a mode of legal reasoning that
the judiciary should embrace and defer to when it rules on labour law matters.15
Te old legality paradigm is often iterated by courts and scholars dealing
with successor rights and the broad legal criteria that govern them.16 It seems
clear that this intellectual pattern can be found at least in Canada, the United

13.

14.

15.
16.

better means of guaranteeing industrial peace and of establishing equitable relations between
employer and employees” at para 26); United Food and Commercial Workers, Local 503 v Wal
Mart Canada Corp, 2014 SCC 45, [2014] 2 SCR 323 (LeBel J, justifying curial deference to
labour arbitrators on grievances for shop closures on the basis of their “expert knowledge and
the fact that they are specialists in such matters” at para 88).
Pursuant to section 121 of Manitoba’s Labour Relations Act, for example, arbitrators are free
to consider “the real substance of the matter in dispute between the parties” and are “not
bound by a strict legal interpretation of the matter in dispute.” See Labour Relations Act,
RSM 1987, c L10. A quasi-identical provision can be found at section 82(2) of the British
Columbia Labour Relations Code. See Labour Relations Code, RSBC 1996, c 244. As for the
purposive interpretation component of the old legality, the preamble of the Canada Labour
Code once spoke of the “promotion of the common well-being through the encouragement
of free collective bargaining.” See Canada Labour Code, RSC 1970, c L-1, quoted in Health
Services and Support-Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 SCC 27 at
para 65, [2007] 2 SCR 391.
Tat said, some traces of it can be found regarding collective bargaining’s more marginal
cousin, individual employment standards statutes. See e.g. Ruth Sullivan, Sullivan on the
Construction of Statutes, 5th ed (Markham, Ont: Lexis Nexis Canada, 2008) at 486-90
(establishing “social welfare legislation” as a distinct category of laws subject to broad
purposive interpretation and not to the principles applicable to other types of legislation).
See supra note 12.
See e.g. Adams, supra note 11; Ivanhoe, supra note 12; UES, local 298 v Bibeault, [1988] 2
SCR 1048, 13 ACWS (3d) 23 [Bibeault].
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Kingdom, and the United States.17 It may even be found across the industrialized
North Atlantic.18
In this article I propose a new approach to teaching and studying labour
law doctrine that suggests that the old legality paradigm is not an accurate
description of how labour and employment law works in practice. Taking a series
of classic union successor rights decisions from Canada as a case study, I argue
that labour law is made not through pragmatic, non-legal, and case-by-case
purposive analysis, but rather proceeds as an endless chain of conventionally
legal questions on which decision makers deploy policy argument to justify legal
holdings.19 Tus, rather than the application of a single purpose to the factual
matrix, the adjudicators and courts justify their holdings through contradictory
policy arguments (including diverging purposes) that reveal deep normative
confict and contingency in the structure of labour law. To illustrate this
argument, I use analytical methods created by American legal realists and critical
legal studies. Tese include the technique of pairing contradictory arguments
on a given question, and “nesting,” whereby several distinct legal questions are
reframed as an infnite chain of related, ever-narrower sub-questions on which

17. On the United States, see Samuel Estreicher & Matthew T Bodie, Labour Law (St Paul,
Minn: Foundation Press, 2016) at 56-57; Alvin L Goldman & Roberto L Corrada, Labour
Law in the USA, 3d ed (Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2011) at 78, 433; Michael C Harper, Samuel Estreicher & Kati Grifth, Labor Law:
Cases, Materials, and Problems, 8th ed (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2015) at 649-50, 658;
Roger I Abrams, Inside Arbitration: How an Arbitrator Decides Labor and Employment Cases
(Arlington, VA: Bloomberg BNA, 2013) at 8, 10, 32; Frank Elkouri & Edna Asper Elkouri,
How Arbitration Works, 7th ed (Chicago: American Bar Association, 2012) at 1-1 to 1-3.
On the United Kingdom, see Hugh Collins, KD Ewing & Aileen McColgan, Labour Law
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 34; Anne CL Davies, Perspectives on
Labour Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 3.
18. I am less confdent about this. For analyses on France, see Antoine Mazeaud, Droit du
travail, 2d ed (Paris: Monchrestien, 2000) at 14-15; Christophe Radé, Droit du travail et
responsabilité civile (Paris: LGDJ, 1997) at 3-5. On Germany, see the materials cited in Roger
Blanpain et al, Te Global Workplace. International and Comparative Employment Law: Cases
and Materials (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 409. For analyses positing
my “old legality” as symptomatic of transnational trends in legal thought, including in labour
law, see Justin Desautels-Stein, “Pragmatic Liberalism: Te Outlook of the Dead” (2014)
55:4 BCL Rev 1041 at 1069; Kennedy, “Tree Globalizations,” supra note 10 at 41.
19. I will use the term “decision makers” to designate any and all bodies or persons adjudicating
labour law matters, including labour boards, arbitrators, and courts. I will make it clear
when I wish to refer only to administrative (as opposed to judicial) adjudicators, or only to a
subset of those.
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the same arguments can be applied recurrently.20 Finally, I rely on theories of
legal indeterminacy21 to emphasize what Max Weber called the “confict of the
gods”:22 intractable confict between incommensurable values and norms, which
manifest themselves here as policy arguments in favour of broader or narrower
rules governing union successor rights.
Tere are several reasons why one would be interested in such an analysis.
Te frst is analytical accuracy; I claim that my model of conficting and
incommensurable policy arguments is a better description of actual labour law
reasoning than the old legality paradigm. Practitioners and legal theorists should
be interested in this. Te second impetus behind such a démarche is political.
Seeing the post-war labour and employment law regime as animated by a
coherent, purposive, and non-legal logic potentially has normative consequences
for the scope of law reform projects we think are possible and desirable. Te
displacement of the post-war regime by a purported neoliberal deregulatory
agenda may tempt labour lawyers to merely brandish the old legality fag of
non-legal pragmatism, as opposed to advocating more profound legal changes
both within and beyond the labour law regime in the direction of, say, radical
equality, participation, and redistribution. In other words, as Karl Klare famously
argued in his critique of the post-war labour model’s “social conceptualism,” the
old legality might reinforce the status quo.23 Underlining the deep normative
conficts inside the pragmatic and purposive fortress might lead us to see the
structure of the economy as much more open to contestation and redesigning.
Tis article is thus based on the assumption that labour law doctrine matters a
great deal politically. It is meant to counter a certain neglect of doctrine (and

20. See e.g. Karl Llewellyn, “Remarks on the Teory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or
Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed” (1950) 3:3 Vand L Rev 395 [Llewellyn];
Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication” (1976) 89:8 Harv
L Rev 1685 at 1723-24; Duncan Kennedy, “A Semiotics of Legal Argument” in Collected
Courses of the Academy of European Law 3:2 (1994) 309 at 344, 346 [Kennedy, “Semiotics”].
See also Jack Balkin, “Te Crystalline Structure of Legal Tought” (1986) 39:1 Rutgers L
Rev 1 at 5 [Balkin].
21. See infra notes 133-135 and accompanying text.
22. “Science as a Vocation” in David Owen & Tracy B. Strong, eds, Te Vocation Lectures:
“Science as a Vocation”, “Politics as a Vocation” (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 2004) at 27.
23. Klare, supra note 10.
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critical analysis thereof ) in favour of institutional mechanisms and enforcement
in contemporary labour law scholarship.24
Te post-war purposes of redressing unequal bargaining power in order to
attain stability and industrial peace have been criticized by sophisticated labour
law theorists, who have proposed alternatives ranging from human rights25
(or capabilities theory26) to economic efciency.27 But there has never been,
to my knowledge, a sustained internal critique of the old legality’s theory of
24. See e.g. Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, “Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply
Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in International Subcontracting
Networks” (2013) 35:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 1; Cynthia Estlund, “Rebuilding the Law
of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation” in Brian Bercusson & Cynthia Estlund, eds,
Regulating Labour in the Wake of Globalisation: New Challenges, New Institutions (Portland:
Hart Publishing, 2008) 89 at 112; Lance Compa, “From Chile to Vietnam: International
Labour Law and Workers’ Rights in International Trade” in Grainne de Búrca, Claire
Kilpatrick & Joanne Scott, eds, Critical Legal Perspectives on Global Governance: Liber
Amicorum David M Trubek (Portland: Hart Publishing 2013) 143 [de Búrca, Kilpatrick &
Scott]; Bob Hepple, Labour Laws and Global Trade (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005) at
151-92; Alain Supiot, “Governing Work and Welfare in a Global Economy” in Jonathan
Zeitlin & David M Trubek, eds, Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy: European
and American Experiments (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003) 376 at 382-87;
Virginia A Leary, “Te Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Rights” in Lance A Compa
& Stephen F Diamond, eds, Human Rights, Labour Rights, and International Trade
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996) 22 at 39-43.
25. See Bob Hepple, “Equality and Empowerment for Decent Work” (2001) 140:1 Int’l Lab Rev
5 at 9; Nicolas Valticos, “International Labour Standards and Human Rights: Approaching
the Year 2000” (1998) 137:2 Int’l Lab Rev 135 at 138; Deirdre McCann, “Decent Working
Hours as a Human Right: Intersections in the Regulation of Working Time” in Tonia Novitz
& Colin Fenwick, eds, Human Rights at Work: Perspectives on Law and Regulation (Portland:
Hart Publishing, 2010) 509 at 514.
26. See Amartya Sen, “Work and Rights” (2000) 139:2 Int’l Lab Rev 82, republished as a “special
supplement” in vol 152 (2013); Brian Langille, “Imagining Post Geneva Consensus Labour
Law for Post Washington Consensus Development” (2010) 31:3 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J
523 at 525; Tonia Novitz & Colin Fenwick, Introduction: Te Application of Human Rights
Discourse to Labour Relations: Translation of Teory into Practice, in Novitz & Fenwick, supra
note 26 at 37; Jude Browne, Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, “Capabilities, Social Rights
and European Market Integration” in Robert Salais & Rovert De Villeneuve, eds, Europe and
the Politics of Capabilities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 205.
27. See Alan Hyde, “Te International Labor Organization in the Stag Hunt for Global Labor
Rights” (2009) 3:2 L & Ethics Human Rights 154 at 163; Christopher McCrudden &
Anne Davies, “A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights” (2000) 3:1 J Int’l Econ L 43 at
51-52; Michael Trebilcock, “Trade Policy and Labour Standards: Objectives, Instruments and
Institutions” in John Kirton & Michael Trebilcock, eds, Hard Choices, Soft Law (Burlington,
Vt: Ashgate, 2004) 170 at 173-74; David Charny, “Regulatory Competition and the Global
Coordination of Labor Standards” (2000) 3:2 J Int’l Econ L 281 at 300.
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legal reasoning akin to that performed on deductive private law reasoning by
anti-formalist scholars of all stripes.28 Tese include the American legal realists
and their use of the category “policy” to emphasize the political contestability of
nineteenth-century laissez-faire legal approaches.29 Tis is the kind of scholarly
agenda I exemplify here using Canadian union successor rights adjudication as a
case study. I chose successor rights adjudication because of its centrality to the old
legality paradigm: Protection of bargaining rights is at the core of the perceived
mandate of pragmatic and purposive labour decision makers, in this case labour
boards.30 I also chose successor rights because of their central political importance
in the context of the disintegration of the North American labour law model in
the face of changing business structures. As I will explain below, I could have
illustrated my proposed approach using other topics of labour law. Confronted
with a choice, I decided that union successor rights would be analytically and
politically rewarding.
Te article proceeds as follows. Parts I and II briefy summarize some of
the classic successor rights cases from Ontario and Quebec whereby labour
boards and courts have adopted and applied the test to determine whether there
was a transfer of a business so as to trigger the application of successor rights
provisions. I focus on the adoption of what the case law calls the “instrumental”
approach to the question of how to defne the business—that is, what degree
of organizational continuity is required for bargaining rights to be transferred
(a question that is also central to US union successorship law and EU acquired
rights law).31 According to the instrumental approach, which replaced more
union-friendly legal tests that transmitted bargaining rights when jobs were
moved to a new employer, bargaining rights will not be transmitted merely when
jobs are reassigned, but only when all key components of the business pass to the
alleged successor employer. Four of the cases I analyze deal with subcontracting
arrangements stemming from business reorganizations, and two deal with sales
28. Te exception could be Klare, supra note 10.
29. See e.g. Wesley N Hohfeld, “Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied to Judicial
Reasoning” (1913) 23:1 Yale LJ 16 at 36; Morris Cohen, “Te Basis of Contract” (1933)
46:4 Harv L Rev 553 at 562; Robert Hale, “Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty”
(1943) 43:5 Colum L Rev 603 at 628.
30. Tough this introduction refers to both grievance arbitrators and labour boards,
my case study only deals with the latter as in Canada arbitrators do not deal with union
successorship questions.
31. See Schreiber, supra note 4 at 576-80; Vivien Shrubsall, “Competitive Tendering,
Out-sourcing and the Acquired Rights Directive” (1998) 61:1 Mod L Rev 85 at
89-91 [Shrubsall].
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of assets following bankruptcy. Part III argues that, despite factual diferences,
these cases are best analyzed as interlocking legal questions answered by tribunals
and courts as they work out the implications of the instrumental approach to
the defnition of the business. In this Part, I argue that decision makers have not
merely applied the instrumental approach to new factual contexts but have had
to make legal fndings that were not dictated by that legal test. I read the cases
from Ontario and Quebec together as a pyramid of (nested) sub-questions of law
stemming from the adoption of the instrumental approach. I thereby underline
the interconnectedness of holdings made under that test. Tis goes to the frst
trait of the old legality, i.e., the idea that labour law adjudication can be ad-hoc,
non-legal, and context specifc. Even though successor rights decisions often
present themselves this way, I demonstrate that they are in fact interconnected legal
holdings that build the cumulative framework applicable to successorship claims.
In Part IV, I present the policy arguments that adjudicators have used to justify
their decisions. I present summative tables of policy arguments drawn from all the
cases covered in order to show that the legal questions from the cases are closely
related. With a view to emphasizing that the arguments from the various cases
can be intermingled, I present them in pairs, drawing on diferent cases (dealing
with diferent questions) for each argument. Te idea here is to demonstrate that
the policies can be invoked under any of the nested sub-questions. In assembling
this repertoire of contradictory policy arguments, I also address the second
component of the old legality—i.e., the purported supremacy of purposive or
teleological reasoning. What I mean to convey here is that purposive argument
is seldom determinative, and that other policy arguments often supplement,
counterbalance or set aside purposive arguments. I suggest that this reveals deep
and incommensurable normative conficts inside labour law.
I do not claim that my case study of a series of decisions is representative,
either of labour law as a whole or even of all the successor rights cases out there.
In fact, I do not think it is possible to assemble a set of cases from which one
can generalize to a whole feld of law on a strictly empirical basis. Te analysis
I propose here can thus be seen as a very preliminary illustration of a new kind
of engagement with labour law doctrine, one that views it less as a purposive
and pragmatic form of social engineering and more as a congealed political
compromise that rests on unresolvable normative conficts. It is meant to suggest
that, by extending the model proposed here to other labour law questions and
continuously bringing labour law’s normative conficts to the fore through
teaching and research, labour law scholars can open up the status quo for
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normative contestation and gather momentum to redraw the legal system along
more egalitarian lines.

I. ONTARIO SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM METROPARKING TO AJAX
In this part and the next, I summarize the cases I will use in my analysis of legal
argument. Tese parts get into the lawyerly details of the cases and ofer little
theorizing. Te reasons for this will become apparent as I fesh out my theoretical
assumptions below. Sufce it to say for now that I think the best way to refute
the old legality and to validate my model of intractable normative confict is
to be relentlessly concrete and to study actual argumentative practices as they
play out in cases. Tis approach is based both on a practical and applied view of
legal indeterminacy and on a taste for fnding broader political signifcance in
the technicalities of everyday legal reasoning. Tat is why this article takes the
form of a concrete case study as opposed to a jurisprudential exposition. I hope
the reader will bear with the detailed presentations in Parts I and II and I trust
subsequent parts will make this somewhat dry read rewarding as they build an
overarching critical analytical framework out of this primary material.
Tis part summarizes a few leading Ontario successor rights cases that I
will use in my analysis of legal argument. Tese cases deal with the meaning of
“sale of business” (defned very broadly as “includ[ing] leases, transfers and any
other manner of disposition”),32 the prerequisite for a fnding of successorship
under the Ontario successor rights provision, section 69 of the Labour Relations
Act.33 I start with the foundational Metro-Parking case, in which the Ontario
Labour Relations Board (OLRB) established the “instrumental approach” to the
defnition of business.34 According to that legal test, the transfer of a business
32. Labour Relations Act, 1995, SO 1995, c 1, Schedule A, s 69(1).
33. Section 69(2), the core provision, reads as follows:
Where an employer who is bound by or is a party to a collective agreement with a trade union
or council of trade unions sells his, her or its business, the person to whom the business has
been sold is, until the Board otherwise declares, bound by the collective agreement as if the
person had been a party thereto and, where an employer sells his, her or its business while an
application for certifcation or termination of bargaining rights to which the employer is a
party is before the Board, the person to whom the business has been sold is, until the Board
otherwise declares, the employer for the purposes of the application as if the person were
named as the employer in the application (ibid).

34. Canadian Union of Public Employees v Metropolitan Parking Inc, [1980] 1 CLRBR 197,
[1979] OLRB Rep 1193 [Metro-Parking].
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must involve the organically central elements of the economic activity in
question, and mere similarity of the work done by the previous business and
the alleged successor cannot sufce. Te adoption of the instrumental approach
entailed rejection of a more expansive test, the “functional approach,” according
to which bargaining rights can be transferred when mere jobs (or “functions”)
are moved to another employer. Metro-Parking’s instrumental approach is similar
to the US Supreme Court’s doctrine of “substantial continuity of identity in the
business enterprise,”35 applicable in American union successorship law, as well
as to the approach adopted by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) under the
EU Acquired Rights Directive.36 After dealing with Metro-Parking, I summarize
the OLRB’s subsequent Accomodex37 and Ajax38 decisions, which applied the
instrumental approach to other instances of business transfers. I discuss the
cases in chronological order to give a sense of the way in which Ontario decision
makers have elaborated the implications of the instrumental approach adopted
in Metro-Parking, an approach they have never since repudiated. I then examine
Quebec successor rights cases in Part II. I will build on these summaries in Parts
III and IV as I lay out my combined study of legal argument that spans all the
cases and intermingles the contradictory policy arguments that they contain.
Metro-Parking, a 1979 decision, involved two federal government
subcontractors: Metropolitan Parking Inc (Metropolitan) and Toronto Auto
Parks Ltd (TAP). TAP was engaged in managing and operating the parking
installations at the Toronto Pearson airport as a subcontractor to the federal
government, which owned the airport, the parking facilities, and the assets related
to the parking business.39 Te complainant union had obtained certifcation for
35. John Wiley & Sons, Inc v Livingston, 376 US 543 at 551 (1964) [Wiley].
36. In the famous Süzen case, the ECJ held that there is no transfer of part of a business “if there
is no concomitant transfer of signifcant tangible or intangible assets or the taking over by
the new employer of a major part of the workforce, in terms of their numbers and skills,
assigned by the predecessor to the performance of the contract.” See Süzen v Zehnacker
Gebaudereinigung GmbH and Laefarth GmbH, C-13/95, [1997] ECR I-01259 at I-01263.
Te ECJ further held that the business entity cannot be reduced to the activity entrusted to it
but must “emerge[ ] from other factors, such as the entity’s workforce, its management staf,
the way in which its work is organised, its operating methods … or the operational resources
available to it” (ibid at I-01262).
37. Hotel Employees Restaurant Employees Union, Local 75 v Accomodex Franchise Management Inc,
[1993] OLRB Rep 281, 19 CLRBR (2d) 1 [Accomodex].
38. National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers Union of Canada
(CAW-Canada) and its Local 222 v Charterways Transportation Ltd, Te Corporation of Ajax
(Town of ), [1994] OLRB Rep 1296, 24 CLRBR (2d) 280 [Ajax, OLRB].
39. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 4.
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the employees of TAP, but had never held a certifcation binding the federal
government.40 As TAP’s contract with the government expired, Metropolitan
was chosen to replace TAP as the manager of the parking facilities in the course
of a competitive bidding process. Metropolitan recruited a “substantial number
of TAP’s bargaining unit employees” as well as much of TAP’s management.41
However, there was “no corporate relationship”42 between Metropolitan and
TAP at any time.
Against this factual background, the OLRB held that there was no “sale
of business” as per section 69 (then 55) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act.
In essence, the OLRB held that “there must be more than the performance of like
functions by another business entity”43 for there to be a “sale” of business under
the successor rights provision. As put by the OLRB:
Tere must be a transfer from the predecessor of the essential elements of the
business as a block or as a “going concern.” A business is not synonymous with
its customers or the work it performs or its employees. Rather, it is the economic
organization which is used to attract customers or perform the work.44

Tis has been referred to as the instrumental defnition of the business,
as opposed to a “functional” defnition which hinges on the similarity of the
employees’ functions or work. 45 It will be apparent that the functional approach,
which Metro-Parking rejected, is more pro-union than the instrumental approach
that the case adopted, as it allows for more transfers of bargaining rights.
Metro-Parking also introduced a second requirement that became central to
ulterior case law: that of a “sale” (in the sense of an actual transfer), later referred
to as the need for a “nexus” between the alleged successor and transferor. Tis is
equivalent to the European Court of Justice’s requirement of a “contractual link”
for transfer of acquired rights under EU labour law.46 By rejecting the argument
that the loss of TAP’s contract and the simultaneous hiring of some of TAP’s
employees constituted a “sale,”47 the OLRB made a very infuential fnding.

40. Ibid at para 2. Tis will become very important for subsequent discussion of the application
of the test devised in Metro-Parking.
41. Ibid at para 14-15.
42. Ibid at para 3.
43. Ibid at para 44.
44. Ibid.
45. See e.g. Ajax (Town) v CAW, Local 222, 2000 SCC 23, [2000] 1 SCR 538, at para 9 [Ajax];
Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 75.
46. Shrubsall, supra note 31 at 86.
47. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 45.
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In 1993, some fourteen years after Metro-Parking, the Accomodex case presented
an occasion for the OLRB to clarify some implications of the instrumental
approach. Te question the OLRB faced in Accomodex was whether a transaction
involving only a transfer of assets, with no signifcant transfer of employees (but
with similarity of functions), should automatically be considered insufcient as
per the instrumental approach to successor rights. A second, related question
was whether a hiatus between the operations of alleged successive employers is
determinative and must lead to the rejection of a successorship claim.
Accomodex involved Skyline Triumph Hotel (Triumph), which had closed
because of fnancial difculties.48 Te employees of the hotel had been represented
by a labour union. Eighteen months after the closing, Kelloryn Consulting Inc
(Kelloryn) acquired “the lands, buildings and virtually all of the other tangible
assets formerly used by the Triumph in its hotel operation.”49 Te OLRB found
that there was no signifcant continuity in the workforce, since only ten out of
the 150 ex-employees of Triumph had been hired to work in the new hotel.50
Te OLRB, however, did note that the functions, that is, the work performed
by the new employees, were essentially the same as those performed by the
former employees of Triumph.51 In this context, the OLRB answered two related
questions of law that were potentially determinative: frst, whether a transfer of
mere assets (presumably combined with similarity of functions as in Accomodex)
can, as a matter of law, lead to a fnding of successorship; and second, whether
a hiatus between the alleged successive businesses necessarily impedes a fnding
of successorship. Before answering these questions, the OLRB reiterated that the
applicable test was the instrumental defnition of the business, i.e., a view of the
business as an integrated whole that goes beyond mere similarity of work.52 Te
OLRB also reiterated its fnding in Gordons Markets that a change of employees
is not determinative of the successor rights claim.53 Having made these remarks,
the OLRB found as follows:

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 15.
Ibid at para 18.
Ibid at para 37.
Ibid at para 40.
Ibid at paras 54-55.
Ibid at para 61, citing Retail Clerks Union Local 206 v Gordons Markets a Division of Zehrmart
Ltd, [1978] OLRB Rep 630, [1978] 2 Can LRBR 460. Te Gordons Markets case involved
a grocery store going out of business and a subsequent business taking over its lease to open
a new grocery store on the same premises, without purchasing any inventories or equipment
and, importantly, without hiring former employees.
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[W]e do not think that hiatus is conclusive where, as here, the asset confguration
has remained substantially intact and continues (albeit with renovations) at the core
of the “new” business organization. Our decision has the efect of afxing bargaining
rights to an asset confguration, but in all the circumstances, we do not think that
this is inappropriate when this “part” of the predecessor’s organization is so integral
or essential to its operating capacity.54

Tus, a hiatus will not be determinative and a transfer of assets may sufce,
if such assets are fundamental to the business. Tis adds considerable precision
to the legal framing of the instrumental approach in Ontario as to what can
and cannot sufce under successor rights provisions. After answering these legal
questions, the Board turned to the case at hand and found successorship, in part
because on the facts of the case the assets (and their location) were a fundamental
component of the business, as they had “a relationship with its local market.”55
Te OLRB dealt with another high profle successorship question in the 1994
case of Ajax.56 In that case, the Town of Ajax was faced with a successor rights
claim related to employees it had recently hired in an efort to reassume control
over the operation of its transit system. Te complainant union had obtained
certifcation for the employees of Charterways, a private contractor that had
operated the Ajax public transit system from its creation. Te Town of Ajax had
always been the owner of the assets related to the transit system (buses, buildings,
payment systems, et cetera), while Charterways “provided and coordinated a
complement of trained drivers to operate the buses, and a group of mechanics
and cleaners to maintain and repair the feet.”57 When Charterways’s contract
with the Town of Ajax expired in 1992, however, the Town decided to assume
operation of the transit system. Charterways thus terminated the employees
formerly involved in the operation of the transit system. Te Town of Ajax then
launched a recruitment campaign, as a result of which a “substantial majority”58
of its new employees were former employees of Charterways. Te OLRB ruled
that Ajax was the successor employer to Charterways, relying on some policy
arguments that I will outline below, as well as some key factual fndings. Te
OLRB found that Charterways’s former business “was not the provision or
operation of a bus service,” but rather “consisted primarily of the provision of
a skilled work force to the Town.”59 As a consequence, the OLRB held that the
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Ibid at para 81.
Ibid at para 78.
Ajax, OLRB, supra note 38.
Ibid at para 14.
Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 40.
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workforce taken back by Ajax was Charterways’s “most valuable asset,”60 one that
was “essential to the continued operation of the transit system.”61 Te OLRB also
emphasized that Ajax actively solicited the employees’ applications, and that as a
consequence it “took back more than it initially contracted out.”62
Te OLRB’s decision was quashed by the Ontario Divisional Court on
judicial review, mainly on the basis that “there was no ‘nexus’, ‘legal act’ or ‘legal
relation’”63 between Ajax and Charterways. In other words, unilateral hiring of
another business’s employees is not enough. On appeal, the Ontario Court of
Appeal purported to restore the OLRB’s ruling on this point. Te Court of Appeal
found that the “nexus between Charterways and the Town is the commercial
history without which the Town’s acquisition of the work force would not have
occurred.”64 Te Court of Appeal also agreed with the OLRB that a “business”
had indeed been transferred through the hiring of the employees.65 Te Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal’s decision, noting that the “historical
and functional connection between Charterways and the Town of Ajax”66 was not
an unreasonable basis for the OLRB’s fnding of successorship.

II. QUEBEC SUCCESSOR RIGHTS CASES: FROM BIBEAULT
TO IVANHOE
Te two Quebec cases I analyze follow a similar pattern to those in Ontario in that
they frst forcefully afrmed an “organic” or instrumental approach to successor
rights (in Bibeault)67 and then added some precisions (in Ivanhoe)68 as to what
that test entails. In this part I briefy summarize the two cases before assessing the
conceptual relationship between them and the Ontario cases in part III.
Bibeault involved three subcontractors performing janitorial work for a school
board. Two of these subcontractors, BDM and Netco, originally had contracts
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Ibid at para 41.
Ibid at para 42.
Ibid.
CAW, Local 222 v Charterways Transportation Ltd, 95 CLLC 210-040 at para 40, 84 OAC
281 (Ont Gen Div) [Ajax, Div Ct].
Ajax (Town of ) v National Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
Union of Canada (1998), 41 OR (3d) 426, [1998] 166 DLR (4th) 516 (CA) at para
25 [Ajax, ONCA].
Ibid at paras 26-27.
Ajax, supra note 45 at para 2.
Bibeault, supra note 16.
Ivanhoe, supra note 12.
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with the school board, and their employees were under a union certifcation.
Notably, the school board was never the employer of the janitors, who were from
the start recruited by the subcontractors.69 After the subcontractors’ employees
went on strike, the school board terminated the subcontracts and retained the
services of a new subcontractor, Services Ménagers Roy Ltée (Roy). Te union
initiated proceedings under the Quebec successor rights provision (section
45 of the Quebec Labour Code) to be declared the bargaining agent for the
Roy employees. 70
Justice Beetz, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, put an end to a
division in Quebec labour law between advocates of “functional” and “organic”
(instrumental) defnitions of the “undertaking” (the business).71 Te Court
unequivocally rejected the functional defnition, stressing that two entities cannot
be successors “solely because each of them hires employees engaged in similar
activities.”72 Instead, Justice Beetz adopted the organic defnition put forward
by Justice Lesage of the Quebec Labour Court, a defnition that is strikingly
similar to Metro-Parking’s instrumental approach (and to the ECJ’s approach in
the aforementioned Süzen case):73
It is thus incorrect to treat the undertaking and the positions or functions listed in
the certifcate of certifcation as equivalent. … Instead of being reduced to a list of
duties or functions, the undertaking covers all the means available to an employer
to attain his objective.74

69. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 5.
70. CQLR c C-27, ss 45. Te provisions read as follows:
Te alienation or operation by another in whole or in part of an undertaking shall not invalidate
any certifcation granted under this Code, any collective agreement or any proceeding for the
securing of certifcation or for the making or carrying out of a collective agreement.
Te new employer, notwithstanding the division, amalgamation or changed legal structure
of the undertaking, shall be bound by the certifcation or collective agreement as if he were
named therein and shall become ipso facto a party to any proceeding relating thereto, in the
place and stead of the former employer.

71. Ibid. I am using the words “business” and “sale” instead of “undertaking” and “alienation
or operation by another,” used in the English version of section 45 of the Quebec Labour
Code. I do so because the latter expressions strike me as clumsy translations of entreprise and
aliénation, two French words roughly equivalent to “business” and “sale.”
72. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 219.
73. Ibid at para 67; supra note 36.
74. Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 173-74.
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Justice Beetz also held that one of the corollaries of the organic approach
is the need for a direct “legal relation” between successive employers.75 Tis is
roughly equivalent to the “nexus” in Ontario law and the ECJ’s “contractual
link” requirement.76 Tis essentially doomed the union’s claim, which relied in
part on the idea that the relationship between Roy and the school board created
a legal relation with the previous subcontractors. Since the school board had
never been the employer of the janitors, it did not transfer anything to Roy.
Moreover, the three subcontractors had never planned any transfer of business;
the replacement of BDM and Netco by Roy was caused by competition for
contracts alone.77 Terefore, the Court dismissed the union’s claim and the new
janitors were not unionized.
In 2001, the Supreme Court decided an appeal relating to the framework laid
out in Bibeault. Ivanhoe Inc owned and managed a shopping center. It originally
employed the mall’s janitors itself78 and later subcontracted the janitorial services
to Moderne, which hired the same employees.79 Ivanhoe called for bids at the end
of its contract with Moderne. Moderne did not submit a bid. Ivanhoe entered
into contracts with four companies to replace Moderne’s janitorial services.
Moderne’s workers from the Ivanhoe mall were all terminated and none of them
were hired by the new contractors. Te work performed by the alleged successors
was identical to that previously performed by Moderne.80 Te union that had
represented the janitors employed frst by Ivanhoe and then by Moderne fled a
claim under the Quebec successor rights provision to be declared the bargaining
agent of the new janitors working on the premises of the shopping center.
In Ivanhoe, the Supreme Court validated two theories or doctrines relied
upon by the Quebec Labour Court: the “theory of retrocession” and what I
will call the doctrine of the right to operate. Tese two doctrines correspond
respectively to the two requirements of successor rights outlined in Bibeault
(and Metro-Parking): the need for a “legal relation” (or nexus) and the need
for a transfer of a business (defned in an organic or instrumental manner).
On the frst element, the Court accepted as reasonable the theory of retrocession,
which had been elaborated by the Quebec Labour Court long before Bibeault.81
According to that theory, successor rights provisions do not apply when the work
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Ibid at paras 185, 205.
Shrubsall, supra note 31.
Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 216-18.
Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 3.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 6.
Ibid at para 83.
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of a unionized subcontractor is transferred to a second subcontractor (as was the
case in Bibeault and, incidentally, in Metro-Parking). Te theory of retrocession,
however, allows a fnding of successorship where the entity that is subcontracting
the work was originally covered by a certifcation (as was the case in Ivanhoe).82
Provided that sufciently important elements of the business are transferred,
the subcontracting employer is held to have passed on the business to the frst
subcontractor, taken it back and then passed it on again (“retroceded” it) to the
second subcontractor.83 On the second element, the Court held that a “right to
operate,” defned as the “right to perform specifc duties at a specifc location
for a specifc purpose,”84 could sufce to trigger successor rights provisions if it
is combined with the “transfer of functions,”85 meaning a transfer of jobs, not
necessarily of employees. Te Court held that this defnition was consistent with
the organic approach adopted in Bibeault. It confrmed the issuance of an order
transferring the union certifcation to the four subsequent subcontractors.86

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Ibid at para 3.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 51.
Ibid at para 72.
Te Quebec legislature amended the successor rights provisions as a direct reaction to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Ivanhoe, expressly repudiating the Court’s decision by adding the
words “in addition to functions or the right to operate.” Te new art 45 of the Labour Code
reads as follows:
Te second paragraph [the successor rights provision] does not apply in the case of the transfer
of part of the operation of an undertaking where such transfer does not entail the transfer to the
transferee, in addition to functions or the right to operate, of most of the elements that characterize
the part of the undertaking involved. [emphasis added] (RSQ 2003, c C-27, art 45).

For a while it was not clear how this provision was to be interpreted by labour boards and
courts. If the provision is taken at face value, it might forbid any fnding of successorship
in cases where a subcontractor takes up a new contract without more. Te Quebec labour
board has adopted this interpretation, which essentially rules out the Ivanhoe holding that
bargaining rights can be transferred when a “right to operate” is transferred along with jobs
only. See Union des employés & employées de service, local 800 c École Maïmonide - CPE, 2007
QCCRT 69, DTE 2008T-478 at para 20. Interestingly, however, in a widely-read Quebec
Bar casebook prepared by several partners of the (now defunct) management-side frm
Heenan Blaikie LLP, it was still recently argued that the provision could receive another,
“restrictive interpretation,” “requiring the transfer of characteristic elements other than work,
if there are any.” See Geneviève Beaudin et al, Droit du travail (Cowansville, QC: Tomson
Reuters, 2011) at 160 [emphasis added, translated by the author]. Tis might provide the
seeds for another high-profle successorship battle by opening the door to an application of
the Ivanhoe ruling in some circumstances where the work can be said to be the only element
characterizing the business.
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III. READING THE CASES TOGETHER: QUESTIONS OF LAW
IN PYRAMIDAL INTERCONNECTION
Tis part reads the cases summarized above together, setting the table for a
broader analysis of legal argument across all cases. I argue that the instrumental
defnition of the business, adopted in both provinces, does not eliminate further
disagreement as to the adoption of certain rules to specify the requirements of
the test applicable to successor rights. I also relate the diferent issues posed by
the successor rights cases in order to describe how the instrumental approach
has developed since Metro-Parking and Bibeault. Tis will allow me to present,
in Part IV, an overarching analysis of all the policy arguments raised in support
of broader or narrower successorship rules, thereby illustrating my proposed
approach of eschewing the old legality and emphasizing the unresolved legal
conficts that run across a given series of labour law decisions.
As we have seen, Ontario and Quebec both have foundational cases in
which there was consensus in favour of an instrumental or organic approach to
successor rights. However, both provinces have seen high profle labour disputes
over what exactly the instrumental approach entails in specifc cases (just as the
ECJ has in the context of its own instrumental approach to business transfers
under the European Acquired Rights Directive).87 I now make two claims about
this succession of legal disputes: frst, that the instrumental approach does
not in itself provide an answer to subsequent disputes, and second, that these
disputes are best described as questions of law whereby a rule is added to the
instrumental approach, as opposed to a mere “application” of that approach to
the facts of each case.
Te frst claim is that while the adoption of the instrumental approach was
a turning point in the case law, it did not provide enough guidance to settle
subsequent disputes. Tus, litigants can disagree as to whether, for example,
a mere sale of assets should be considered a priori sufcient or not, while wholly
agreeing that the instrumental approach to successor rights is the test that
applies. Te resolution of this disagreement is not obvious, as the instrumental
approach is defned negatively: Successorship fndings cannot be based merely on
similarity of functions. Beyond that, the adjudicator must look for a transfer of
the “essential elements of the business as a block or as a ‘going concern.’”88 Given
the generality of this test, it is to be expected that subsequent questions would
87. See Gavin Barrett, “Deploying the Classic ‘Community Method’ in the Social Policy Field:
Te Example of the Acquired Rights Directive” (2009) 15:2 Eur LJ 198 at 205.
88. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 44.

MCDOUGALL, CANADIAN UNION SUCCESSOR RIGHTS LAW 275

be raised as to whether certain specifc factors should be a priori insufcient (as
the similarity of functions was). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the
cases summarized above:
FIGURE 1. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CASES
Functional Approach vs.
Instrumental Approach
(Metro-Parking & Bibeault)

Is failure to hire past
employees determinative?
(Gordons Markets)

Is a transaction of assets
after a hiatus of business
necessarily insufcient?
(Accomodex)

Is a unilateral decision to hire
past employees necessarily
insufcient?
(Town of Ajax)

Is a “retroceded” right to
operate combined with
similarity of work necessarily
insufcient?
(Ivanhoe)

As can be seen from Figure 1, the cases all dealt with the question of whether or
not a certain transferred element can sufce at all for a fnding of successorship (as
was also the case in the ECJ cases dealing with the Acquired Rights Directive).89
For instance, the Gordons Markets case answered the question of whether the
failure to hire employees from the alleged predecessor always dooms a successor
rights claim.90 In that case the court held that failure to hire is not determinative.
Once that question was answered, it was open to unions to make claims in cases
where some other element of the business was transferred, but not the employees.
In those cases as well, the employer could raise the question of whether the
particular elements should systematically be considered insufcient. For instance,
in Accomodex it was argued that a mere transfer of assets, combined with a hiatus
between the operation of the two businesses, should be held insufcient. Likewise,
in Ivanhoe the question was whether a “right to operate” (defned in relation to
a specifc location and specifc tasks) that is “retroceded” by a subcontracting
89. Shrubsall, supra note 31 at 89-91.
90. Supra note 53.
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employer originally bound by the certifcation can be sufcient as per the
instrumental approach, even where the employees are not transferred. Finally,
in Ajax the issue was whether a unilateral decision to hire employees can ever be a
sufcient “nexus,” and whether employees alone can ever be sufciently important
elements of the business to warrant a fnding of successorship. In deciding these
matters, adjudicators cannot merely “apply” the instrumental approach, as the
questions go beyond what was settled in Metro-Parking and Bibeault, i.e., the mere
rejection of a test that hinges on similarity of functions. Tis is not to say that
these legal issues are wholly independent of the initial choice of an instrumental
approach. In Part IV I will outline how policy arguments invoked in favour of
and against the instrumental approach have been subsequently raised in favour
of various rules addressing what the instrumental approach entails (this is what
I will call “nesting”). Nevertheless, none of the cases in my diagram turned only
on how to “apply” the instrumental approach to the facts; instead, each of them
saw the adjudicator weigh general policy arguments that resonate with the other
cases involving successor rights and rule more defnitively on the sufciency of a
given factual element.
My second claim is that the cases in Figure 1 all involved choices that are
best characterized as questions of law, not as rule application (or “questions of
mixed law and fact”).91 Indeed, these cases all turned on the question of whether
certain specifc characteristics can sufce to constitute a sale of business as per
the instrumental approach. Although the adjudicators had to apply whatever
test they devised to the facts of the case at hand, the disagreement was over
the defnition of the legal test and specifcally whether that test should a priori
exclude some elements as insufcient (as was done with mere continuity of work
when the instrumental approach was adopted). As put by Justice Bastarache in
his dissent in Ajax, one of the questions in that case was whether “commercial
history on its own can constitute a sufcient nexus.”92 Likewise, Accomodex dealt
with the claim that a hiatus is always determinative. Te same goes for the other
cases. In that sense, even after Ontario and Quebec courts defnitively chose the
instrumental approach (in Metro-Parking and Bibeault, respectively), questions
remained unanswered as to what this entailed as a matter of law. Seeing those
cases as involving questions of law is an important step towards breaking with the
old legality’s view of labour adjudication as the ad-hoc and contextual application

91. Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v Southam Inc, [1997] 1 SCR 748 at para 35,
144 DLR (4th), Iacobucci J.
92. Ajax, supra note 45 at para 9 [emphasis added].
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of broad legal criteria. On my view, labour disputes are much more interrelated,
and it is possible to map common structures of argument across series of cases.

IV. BEYOND PURPOSE AND PRAGMATISM: MAPPING THE
POLICY LANDSCAPE
In this part, I bring the various successor rights cases together to blend the
policy arguments they contain. But before I outline these arguments, I explain
what I mean by “policy.” Policy is a word long used in American private law
discourse. Te following defnition is largely inspired by the literature on policy
argument in private law, which I propose to adapt to the labour law context.93 My
discussion relies on (one might say anthropological) observations of a common
practice, not on any theory of legal interpretation of my own. I take policy
arguments to be arguments about the societal consequences of a given legal rule,
as opposed to arguments based on deductive reasoning (say, from the concept of
rights) or purposive interpretation. Tus, the classic example of policy arguments
is what Jack Balkin calls social utility arguments, which “concern the practical
consequences of a particular rule choice” and “are often expressed in terms of
broad social policies that their advocates believe the law should foster.”94 Tere
are also administrability arguments, which concern the framing of legal norms
either as rigid rules or as open-ended standards, each with its own purported
virtues and vices (e.g., certainty versus fexibility).95 Arguments based on legal
expectations (and the extent to which a given rule responds to them) are also
part of what I mean by policy.96 Te foregoing are examples of what you might
call consequentialist policy arguments. But policy is quite a capacious rhetorical
repertoire, and other kinds of arguments come into play. Indeed, rights can
sometimes intervene not as deductive arguments but as policy considerations
to be balanced against other desiderata.97 Finally, institutional competence
93.
94.
95.
96.

See all references in supra note 27.
Balkin, supra note 20 at 32.
See Pierre Schlag, “Rules and Standards” (1985) 33:2 UCLA L Rev 379 at 383.
On the role of expectations argument in private law, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Te Nature
of the Common Law (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988) at 37-42; Kennedy,
“Semiotics,” supra note 20 at 328, 332.
97. For scholarly takes treating “rights” as just one type of policy to be balanced against other
utilitarian considerations, see Donald Reagan, “Glosses on Dworkin: Rights, Principles,
and Policies” (1978) 76:8 Mich L Rev 1213 at 1232; Kent Greenawalt, “Policy, Rights and
Judicial Decision” (1977) 11:5 Ga L Rev 991 at 1004; David Lyons, “Justifcations and
Judicial Responsibility” (1984) 72:2 Calif L Rev 178 at 188-89.
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arguments concerning the separation of powers between courts and legislatures
(say, the extent to which a given rule requires courts to enter legislative terrain)
are sometimes invoked in the same fashion.98
Of course, purposive arguments are still recurrent in labour law and appear
alongside policy arguments. It is just that they are only rarely (if ever) conclusive.
Indeed, there can be signifcant disagreement as to what rules to deduce from
the purpose. Tus, rather than being determinative, purposive arguments are
often balanced against competing considerations, or even against competing
interpretations of the purpose. For instance, it often does not amount to much
to argue that a given successor rights rule gives efect to the purpose of protecting
bargaining rights, because the opponent can answer that the legal rule amounts to
extending, not protecting, existing bargaining rights. In other words, purposive
argument itself becomes a terrain of struggle, which can open the door to other
conficting policy considerations.
I now turn to the arguments relied on by the decision makers in the cases.
I regroup them according to whether they justify “broader” or “narrower” successor
rights rules and present them in Tables 1 and 2. Te instrumental approach itself
is an example of a narrower rule in that it is more restrictive than the alternative
functional approach, which is based on the sufciency of similarity of jobs. Te
proposition that unilateral hiring of employees can be sufcient and the theory
of retrocession are examples of broader rules, as they lead to more transfers of
bargaining rights than their alternatives, i.e., that unilateral hiring and retroceded
contracts are always insufcient. My basic idea is that while each of the arguments
was formulated with respect to the particular question at hand, it can also be
invoked to support other legal rules that are on the same side (i.e., favouring
narrower or broader interpretations). Tis means that, for example, arguments
invoked in favour of a rule that unilateral hiring never creates a sufcient nexus
could be invoked against the theory of retrocession. Tis is an application of
the idea of “nesting.” Duncan Kennedy describes this phenomenon, taking the
tort law example of deciding whether to allow a defence of mistake in certain
circumstances and, supposing such a defence is allowed, subsequently deciding
whether to apply an objective standard to the mistake:
98. Tis theme of argument was the historical product of the infuence of “process” theories
of law like those of Lon Fuller, Henry Hart, and Albert Sacks, who were preoccupied with
fnding the most appropriate forum for a given legal decision. See Gary Peller, “Neutral
Principles in the 1950’s” (1988) 21:4 U Mich JL Ref 561 at 566-72. For an application of
the institutional competence policy theme in private law, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, “Te
Responsive Model of Contract Law” (1984) 36:5 Stan L Rev 1107 at 1117-27.
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‘Nesting’ is my name for the reproduction, within a doctrinal solution to a problem,
of the policy confict the solution was supposed to settle. […] ‘Nesting’ is the
reappearance of the inventory when we have to resolve gaps, conficts or ambiguities
that emerge when we try to put our initial solution to a doctrinal problem into
practice. In this case, we frst deploy the pro and con argument-bites in deciding
whether or not to permit a defence of mistake. We then redeploy them in order to
decide whether to require that the mistake be made reasonable.99

Te idea is that arguments can be transferred from one question to the
next indefnitely. Tis does not mean that diferences, both geographic and
temporal, do not matter when analyzing cases from diferent jurisdictions and
periods. For example, there might be diferences in the applicable legislative
wording, both over time and between jurisdictions, that complicate the kind of
analysis I propose. But this is not a problem for the six cases I analyze here. Te
Ontario and Quebec legislation, for all intents and purposes, did not change
throughout the time periods covered by my cases.100 Tat said, there are some
slight diferences between Ontario and Quebec successor rights law, including
the fact that the Quebec provision extends not only to sales of business but also
to cases where a business is “operated by another.”101 Tis diference is of little
consequence, however, as all my cases deal with fact patterns that fall under both
provisions.102 But even if there were such diferences between the cases, they
would not invalidate or prevent the kind of structural analysis of legal argument I
am proposing here. All the questions I map in Figure 1 had to be settled judicially
99. Kennedy, “Semiotics,” supra note 20 at 344, 346.
100. Tis can be confrmed by a quick glance at the provisions transcribed in the decisions I
analyze. In the case of Ontario, my four cases were not afected by the 1993 amendments to
the Labour Relations Act that provided for successor rights protection for retendered service
contracts nor by the 1995 amendments that repealed those provisions and took Crown
employees outside the scope of successor rights provisions to facilitate privatization. For
an overview of those contradictory amendments, see Harish C Jain & S Muthu, “Ontario
Labour Law Reforms: A Comparative Study of Bill 40 and Bill 7” (1996) 4 CLELJ 311
at 323-25. Te reason the Ontario cases are not afected is that the only case potentially
subject to those provisions, Ajax, involved neither service contracts nor Crown employees.
In the case of Quebec, though the cases analyzed here are not touched by any legislative
amendment, the successor rights provision was amended shortly after the Supreme Court
rendered its Ivanhoe ruling. For thoughts on how the jurisprudential debates I analyze here
could be extended into this new legislative context, see supra note 87.
101. See supra note 70.
102. For an example of a fact pattern where this distinction would make a diference, we can think
of a receiver operating a business as part of a receivership regime, which would likely be
captured by the Quebec but not the Ontario successorship provision. See, Adams, supra note
11 at para 8.54, giving the example of St-Louis Redding Co. (Re) (1982), 42 CBR (N.S.) 75
(Qc Lab Com’r).
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and were thus not conclusively answered by the legislative wording in force (nor,
I would add, by the applicable precedents). My point is precisely that even for
cases dealing with distinct questions in diferent legislative and jurisprudential
contexts (and in two provinces), it is still possible to extract a common pattern
of policy arguments that are interchangeable across all the diferent questions
(provided the questions are sufciently related to be “nested”). It is this common
structure of argument, rather than details of the jurisprudential and legislative
background, that I propose be relentlessly tracked both to get a better sense of
possible argumentative strategies and to map the unresolved normative conficts
at the heart of the labour law regime.
I have grouped the arguments in fourteen pairs: in seven pairs, the initiative
comes from the party advocating broader successorship rules (the union); in the
other seven the initiative comes from the party advocating narrower rules (the
employer).103 However, my confguration is not the only one possible; far from
it. Many arguments could respond to more than one opposing claim. Moreover,
these arguments could be persuasive on their own. Tus, my list is better seen as
a group of 28 individual policy arguments than as a list of fxed pairs.
104105

TABLE 1: UNION-INITIATED ARGUMENT PAIRS
Arguments for a Broader Interpretation of
Successor Rights Provisions

Arguments for a Narrower Interpretation of
Successor Rights Provisions

1a. Te broader rule is appropriate because
it gives efect to the remedial purpose of
successor rights provisions.104

1b. Te broader rule is inappropriate because it
defeats the legislative intent by expanding instead
of merely protecting bargaining rights.105

103. By “initiative,” I do not refer to who initiates the procedures. For obvious reasons, unions
are almost always the ones bringing successorship claims following an employer’s business
decision. Rather, I refer to a chronological order, i.e., who voices the frst argument and who
responds. Tis is a heuristic move meant to better illustrate the fact that the second argument
of a pair is often a response to the frst one.
104. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 27; Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 94, quoting Ajax,
ONCA, supra note 64 at para 24.
105. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 64.
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2a. Te narrower rule marking certain
elements as fatal to a successorship claim
amounts to reading in restrictions on the scope
of successor rights provisions and subverting
legislative intent.106

2b. Te narrower rule marking certain
elements as fatal to a successorship claim is
not excluded by the wording of successor
rights provisions and may thus be implied by
purposive interpretation.107

3a. Te broader rule responds to employees’
legitimate expectation that their bargaining
rights will not be nullifed because of
commercial activities.108

3b. It is unreasonable to expect a broader rule
that protects jobs instead of merely protecting
bargaining rights, because that exceeds the
purpose of successor rights provisions.109

4a. A stringent standard for successorship in
subcontracting creates inequality between
employees working in core sectors of the
business and employees working in peripheral
sectors, the transfer of which will not give
rise to a fnding of successorship under a
narrower rule.110

4b. Unions can minimize the damage done
by the narrower rule by seeking region-wide
instead of single workplace bargaining units in
a subcontracted part of a business.111

5a. Te broader rule pays special attention
to continued employment and similarity of
functions, and rightly so, because the relevance
of the business to the employees is based on
the work it provides.112

5b. Te broader rule attaches too much
importance to work as a determinative element
of the business and unduly grants unions
an “absolute right of property in the work
performed by [their] members.”113

106. Ajax, Div Ct, supra note 63 at para 28, citing UFCW v Parnell Foods Ltd, [1992] OLRB Rep
1164 at para 91, 17 CLRBR.
107. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 160-62.
108. Ajax, Div Ct, supra note 63 at para 21, citing Lester (WW) (1978) Ltd v United Association of
Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipeftting Industry, Local 740, [1990] 3 SCR
644 at 409, 76 DLR (4th) 389; Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 20.
109. Canada Post Corporation and Nieman’s Pharmacy v Canadian Union of Postal Workers
(1989), 4 CLRBR (2d) 161 at para 52, 1989 CarswellNat 854 (WLNext Can) [Nieman’s
Pharmacy]. I have not summarized the Nieman’s case above for brevity’s sake, but I include
it here because it contains arguments that can be transposed to other legal questions and ft
well in my table. Tis case dealt with the transfer of some postal business by Canada Post to
a pharmacy and involved the legal question of whether good faith subcontracting can ever
trigger successor rights provisions.
110. Ivanhoe inc c Travailleurs & travailleuses unis de l’alimentation & du commerce, section
500, [1999] RJQ 32 at para 138, 1998 CarswellQue 4709 (WLNext Can) (QCCA) LeBel J
[Ivanhoe, QCCA].
111. Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 222.
112. Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 59.
113. Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 36, citing British American Bank Note Co Ltd, [1979]
OLRB Rep Feb 72.
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6a. Te narrower rule put forward by
management is bad for employers, because
the elimination of bargaining rights provokes
new organizing campaigns and potential
labour conficts.114

6b. Te broader rule put forward by the
union, in turn, hurts the employees by
unduly extending bargaining rights and
circumventing the certifcation process, thus
preventing employees from expressing their
wishes in a vote.115

7a. Te broader rule accounts for the fact that
the mischief addressed by successor rights
(the undermining of bargaining rights) is
present even when there is no strong “nexus”
or “legal relation”.116

7b. Te broader rule wrongly allows successorship fndings to be made in the absence of
a strong “nexus” or “legal relation” between
alleged successors. Tus, under the broader
rule, routine commercial activities such as
losing a contract to a competitor might lead to
an undue fnding of successorship.117

114115116117118119120121122123

TABLE 2: EMPLOYER-INITIATED ARGUMENT PAIRS
Arguments for a Narrower Interpretation of
Successor Rights Provisions

Arguments for a Broader Interpretation of
Successor Rights Provisions

8a. Te broader rule goes against the
legislative intention that certifcation attach
to a single employer.118

8b. On the contrary, the broader rule accounts
for the fact that the legislature intended that
the instrumental test be adapted to “the reality
of the business practices it is addressing.” 119

9a. Te narrower rule preserves the employer’s
“legal freedom to dispose of its business.” 120

9b. Te narrower rule does not account
for the fact that, in light of the purpose of
successorship provisions, “[o]ne should not
expect commercial law considerations to be
paramount”121 in the interpretation of
the provisions.

10a. Te broader rule leads to
unpredictable results, creating legal
(and economic) uncertainty.122

10b. On the contrary, the broader rule
contributes to legal (and economic) certainty
by ensuring the “stability of certifcations.”123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 146; Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 46.
Nieman’s Pharmacy, supra note 109 at para 37.
Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 46.
Ibid at para 36, citing NABET v Radio CYJC Ltd et al (1978) 1 CLRBR 565 [NABET].
Bibeault, supra note 16 at paras 159-62.
Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 92.
Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 20.
Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 52.
Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 218.
Ivanhoe, QCCA, supra note 110 at para 186.
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11a. Te broader rule is overbroad and leads
to unwarranted fndings of successorship in
situations where there is no continuity of
the business.124

11b. On the contrary, the broader rule is
“fexible” and allows for consideration of the
facts of each given case.125

12a. Te broader rule extends successor
rights to cases where it would be unfair or
unpractical to transfer the collective agreement
as well as the certifcation. Tus it extends
beyond ‘real’ cases of successorship.126

12b. Courts always struggle with the transfer
or modifcation of an existing collective
agreement when making a fnding of
successorship; the broader rule is not unique
in this regard.127

13a. Te broader rule creates a perverse
incentive not to engage in a given economic
activity (e.g., hiring employees or buying assets
from the alleged predecessor) in order to avoid
the application of successor rights provisions.128

13b. Te narrower rule encourages employer
schemes to undermine bargaining rights.129

14a. Relaxing the standard for the transfer
of “part of a business” (i.e., subcontracting)
does not account for the complexity and
interdependence of all the components of the
business, which cannot easily be separated.130

14b. Te scope of successor rights should
be broadened to account for new economic
realities (corporate restructuring, fexible forms
of production, et cetera).131

124125126127128129130131

Tese tables are meant to make apparent the potential interchangeability of
policy arguments across many sub-questions. For a given choice between broader
and narrower rules, for instance between accepting and rejecting the theory of
retrocession, decision makers could rely on all the arguments presented above.
Tus, they could hold that the theory of retrocession should be rejected because it
leads to legal uncertainty (argument 10a), is overbroad (argument 11a), does not
account for the interdependence of the various parts of the business (argument
14a), et cetera. And these arguments could be met with their opposites, i.e., that
a broader rule such as the theory of retrocession contributes to legal certainty
and the stability of certifcations (argument 10b), is fexible (argument 11b) and
accounts for the realities of the new economy (argument 14b).
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Bibeault, supra note 16 at para 166.
Ivanhoe, supra note 12 at para 94.
Ibid at para 159 (Bastarache J, dissenting).
Ibid at para 11 (Arbour J, for the majority).
Metro-Parking, supra note 34 at para 36, quoting NABET, supra note 117.
Ivanhoe, QCCA, supra note 110 at para 186.
Nieman’s Pharmacy, supra note 109 at para 41.
Ajax, OLRB, supra note 38 at paras 31-33; Accomodex, supra note 37 at para 75.
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Te tables also reveal that purposive arguments are susceptible to many
conficting interpretations that undermine their claim to conclusiveness.
As mentioned earlier, the purpose of “protecting bargaining rights” (argument
1a) can be met with the response that the relevant rule “expands rather than
protects” these rights (argument 1b). As evidenced by the arguments 2a and
2b, purposive arguments related to institutional competence and the separation
of powers are often no more conclusive. Claims that adopting a restrictive rule
amounts to judicially rewriting the legislation (argument 2a) can be met with
the contrary argument that a broad reading of the provision also amounts to
judicial usurpation of the legislative role (argument 2b). Likewise, the claim that
the legislature intended to attach bargaining rights to one employer (argument
8a) can be met with the claim that the legislature also intended that the concept
of “employer” be contextualized in light of the facts of each case and economic
context (argument 8b); to which one can answer that the facts of the case are
clear as to who is the one employer to which bargaining rights should attach,
et cetera. It seems that purposive arguments are unlikely to be conclusive on
their own. Instead, they will probably be accompanied by a balancing of other
policy arguments pertaining to the separation of powers, the expectations and
legal rights of the parties, the efects of the proposed rule on economic activity
or legal certainty.
My analysis of successor rights cases is meant to suggest deep normative
conficts and legal indeterminacy (in the sense of there being no ‘right answer’).
However, I have proposed a relentlessly practical account of legal indeterminacy
and do not intend to ofer much theorizing on the subject, except to say the
following. I do not claim that law is always indeterminate but rather that
incommensurable normative conficts are created by the actors’ legal work.132
In other words, indeterminacy can be created by the fnding of a contrary
argument that perfectly neutralizes another one. But of course sometimes law
is determinate in the sense that one (policy) argument is more convincing
because no actor marshals another equally convincing argument. It is just that
whether this will happen seems wildly unpredictable, making indeterminacy
an ever-present possibility. In a given situation, the parties’ (or the judge’s)
132. For the inspiration of this approach, see Mark Tushnet, “Defending Te Indeterminacy
Tesis” (1996) 16:3 Quinnipiac L Rev 339 at 347; Duncan Kennedy, “A Left/
Phenomenological Alternative to the Hart/Kelsen Teory of Legal Interpretation” in Legal
Reasoning, Collected Essays (Aurora, CO: Te Davies Group, 2008) 154 at 154-57 [Kennedy,
“Left/Phenomenological”]; Joseph William Singer, “Te Player and the Cards: Nihilism and
Legal Teory” (1984) 94:1 Yale LJ 1 at 21-22.
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eforts may produce one right answer, or they may not. Tis phenomenological
approach to indeterminacy focuses not on the immutable nature of law but on
actors’ experience of it as the “reality” to be studied.133 Hence, one could see my
analysis above as itself creating indeterminacy and demonstrating the possibility
thereof, by systematically pairing up arguments that neutralize each other (just
as Llewellyn famously did with the canons of statutory interpretation).134 Tis is
enough to fesh out my claim that the cases I explored evidence deep, potentially
intractable normative conficts.
I do want to stress again that the approach to labour law doctrine I have
exemplifed here is not based on a representative sample of cases. Tat is, I do not
claim to have assembled a sample of cases that share characteristics that are
generalizable to all of union successor rights law, let alone to labour law as a
whole. Such a claim would in my view be untenable. For example, my analysis
would not be more representative of Canadian successor rights law even if I had
chosen, say, twelve cases instead of six, cases from four provinces instead of two,
or cases that cover a shorter time period. It seems to me that one can never claim
to have amassed a sample of cases representative of all those that are out there.
Rather than an empirical demonstration in the strict sense, I have sought to
provide an illustration of the way in which a small group of cases can be arranged
doctrinally so as to make apparent (or, to put it in more phenomenological terms,
to create) incommensurable conficts of legal argument. I do think that my
arranging of the cases in a pyramidal form of sub-questions dealing with the legal
sufciency of certain elements illustrates how this analysis can be applied to any
successor rights case dealing with whether there is a “sale of business” in a given
instance. Te whole point of my reframing of case-by-case rule applications as
logically and chronologically interrelated questions of law is to suggest that such
an extension is possible. However, this is the most I can achieve given my space
constraints, and by necessity my analysis falls short of an empirical demonstration
based on a scientifcally sound sample of cases. Instead, the reader should see my
analysis as an illustration of what can be achieved when we abandon the old
legality approach and look for intractable policy conficts in labour law, and as an
invitation to incorporate this method in teaching and doctrinal research.
On a related note, I have to leave for later exploration the suggestion that this
framework could be extended to other labour law questions such as the elements
required to make out just cause for dismissal, legitimate business reason for a layof,
133. For the most elaborate and best known discussion of indeterminacy in phenomenological
terms, see Kennedy, “Left/Phenomenological,” supra note 132.
134. Llewellyn, supra note 20.
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European-style proportionality of strike action and constitutional protection of
strikes depending on their objectives (“purely political” or otherwise), North
American-style unfair labour practices and bad faith bargaining, et cetera. Sufce
it for now to mention that I think my model, based as it is on policy argument in
favour of narrower and broader rules on the legal sufciency of certain elements
under a given test, is capable of being extended to many other areas of labour and
employment law writ large. Again, this is a call to take up this kind of analysis
and constantly work with the hypothesis that, in labour and employment law,
there is no single set of rules that is responsive to pragmatic and socially purposive
reasoning, but rather a hodgepodge of unexplainable policy choices that shape
the economy at any given point and that could easily be redesigned entirely to
favour diferent policies and material interests.

V. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have analyzed a series of Canadian cases on successor rights in
which labour adjudicators and courts have dealt with the question of whether
bargaining rights should be transferred to another business entity in the context
of sales, restructuring, and subcontracting. Parts I and II summarized classic
successor rights cases from Ontario and Quebec dealing with the instrumental or
organic approach to the meaning of “sale of a business,” according to which there
needs to be a transfer of the business as a whole and mere similarity of functions
does not sufce. In Part III, I argued that these cases are best understood as a series
of interdependent legal holdings as to what elements should be per se insufcient,
not merely as the application of the instrumental approach to a particular fact
pattern. In Part IV I read together the arguments used to justify diferent legal
holdings and demonstrated that each policy argument can be raised in many
diferent cases, rendering purposive argument inconclusive. I attempted to cast
doubt on a particular legal theory, the old legality, according to which labour
law is made not through conventional legal reasoning but through non-legal
and ad-hoc applications of loose legal criteria in light of purposive reasoning.
Based on my account of conficting legal policy arguments, I argued that the old
legality paradigm should be abandoned in favour of an approach that embraces
the incommensurable normative and legal conficts that pervade the collective
bargaining regime and the economy it structures.
One might object that the old legality is a strange target because it has,
to some extent, been displaced as the intellectual paradigm of choice in light of
the perceived defciencies of the post-war labour regimes in the new economy.
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While labour lawyers, scholars, and courts have by and large stuck to the old
legality,135 some sophisticated labour lawyers have been busy outlining alternative
normative frameworks, sometimes based on human rights, capabilities theory,
or economic efciency.136 However, many other scholarly takes on the new
economy merely propose new modes of enforcement of labour laws while in fact
implicitly or explicitly maintaining the old legality as the governing approach.137
It thus seems as if the old legality will not be easily displaced and is deserving of
critical scrutiny.
Te need for critical scrutiny is reinforced by the fact that the old legality and
its rationalization of law according to non-legal, expert perceptions of the good of
society, in a context where the existing labour law regimes are what is rationalized,
may well have the efect of reinforcing the status quo. It may do so by supplying
an overarching normative justifcation for existing legal regimes that validates
them and holds them to be more than they really are, i.e., ad-hoc and often
unexplainable compromises between various conficting policies, and ultimately
between various material interests. I rely here on Hans Kelsen’s analysis of the
legitimating function of natural law, by which he also meant the “sociological
jurisprudence”138 from which labour law’s old legality was born. For Kelsen, law
is a positive system of coercion ordering various contradictory interests, and
attempts to justify it by reference to any outside criterion of “justice” legitimize
the order in place:
Seen from the standpoint of rational cognition, there are only interests and thus
conficts of interests, which are resolved by way of an ordering of interests that either
satisfes the one at the expense of the other, or establishes a balance, a compromise
between the opposing interests. Tat only one ordering of interests has absolute
value (which really means, ‘is just’) cannot be accounted for by way of rational
cognition. … Only positive law is given to cognition. … Te less one strives to
separate clearly the positive law from justice, and the more indulgent one is toward
the lawmaker’s eforts to have the law also accepted somehow as just, the more one lends
support to the ideological bias that is characteristic of classical, conservative natural law
theory. What matters there is less the cognition of prevailing law than a justifcation
of it, a transfguration, achieved by showing that the positive law is simply the
emanation of a natural or divine order or of a system of reason – the emanation of
an absolutely ‘right’, just order.139
135.
136.
137.
138.

See supra notes 11-18.
See generally, supra notes 25-27.
Supra note 24.
Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Teory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934;
1992) at 41 [Kelsen].
139. Ibid at 17-18 [emphasis added].
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I should mention that, like Kelsen’s view (and that of many critical legal
theorists),140 my view of sociological jurisprudence as legitimizing the status quo
by rationalizing the positive law depends on the claim that said positive law is
not amenable to rationalization because of incommensurable conficts between
“a number of decisions … of equal standing” on each legal question (hence my
emphasis on indeterminacy).141 In short, it is because the status quo does not rest
on logical closure or coherence that the old legality’s rationalization legitimizes it.
It seems very plausible that this rationalization would have a moderating efect on
the law reform avenues we think are possible and worth pursuing.
In the context of the rolling back of the post-war labour law regimes (often
under crisis-induced austerity), preserving the status quo and being “indulgent…
toward the lawmaker’s eforts”142 might be thought to be a good thing. But I
think on balance such a rationalization through the old legality paradigm does
more harm than good. In recent decades, inspiring research has shown that the
post-war North American labour law model and its core collective bargaining
component ofer very partial protection that is often structurally skewed in
favour of certain interests at the expense of others. Particularly, scholars have
underlined the post-war regime’s shortcomings with respect to women,143

140. See the following analyses of the legitimating efect of denying intractable normative conficts
and legal indeterminacy: Alan Freeman, “Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine” (1978) 62:6 Minn
L Rev 1049; Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, “Building Power and Breaking Images: Critical
Legal Teory and the Practice of Law” (1982-83) 11:3 NYU Rev L & Soc Change 369;
Gerald Frug, “Te Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law” (1984) 97:6 Harv L Rev 1276;
Robert W Gordon, “Some Critical Teories of Law and Teir Critics” in David Kairys,
ed, Te Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 3d ed (New York: Basic Books, 1998) 641 at
647-51; Duncan Kennedy, “Te Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries” (1979) 28:2 Buf
L Rev 205 at 217-18.
141. Kelsen, supra note 138 at 80.
142. Ibid at 18.
143. See Judy Fudge, “Reconceiving Employment Standards Legislation: Labour Law’s Little
Sister and the Feminization of Labour” (1991) 7:1 J L & Soc Pol’y 73 at 87-88; Joanna
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich, “Introduction: Interrogating the Work/Family Divide” in Joanne
Conaghan & Kerry Rittich, eds, Labour Law, Work, and Family (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2005) 1.
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ethnic minorities,144 self-employed persons145 and a whole host of sectors of
the economy not amenable to unionization under such a local bargaining unit
model.146 European labour law systems also have their own inadequacies.147 Tese
shortcomings are exacerbated when Northern labour law regimes are transposed
in the Global South.148 Not to mention of course that the new economy has
greatly diminished the post-war model’s efcacy (and eradicated it in the United
States). Further, one could argue that model never went far enough in the
direction of wealth redistribution anyway.149 In this context, it seems useful to
underline the analytical contestability of the old legality on which these regimes
rest, if only to open up the possibility for more ambitious re-regulation of work
in all its forms, perhaps by tackling all the legal regimes that determine living
conditions beyond labour law as traditionally conceived.150 Of course, once one
lets go of the pragmatic and purposive defense of existing regimes in the name of
social stability and industrial peace, other normative projects such as economic
efciency might rear their heads to replace it.151 Tis prospect requires one to
144. See Colleen Sheppard, “Mapping anti-discrimination law onto inequality at work:
Expanding the meaning of equality in international labour law” (2012) 151:1-2 Int’l Lab Rev
1; Adelle Blackett, “Situated refections on international labour law, capabilities, and decent
work: Te case of Centre Maraîcher Eugène Guinois,” Liber Amicorum in honour of Katia
Boustany (2007) hors série RQDI 223.
145. See Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, “Changing Boundaries in Employment:
Developing a New Platform for Labour Law” (2003) 10 CLELJ 329 at 331-32; Brian A
Langille & Guy Davidov, “Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View from
Canada” (1999) 21 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 7 at 16-17 [Langille & Davidov].
146. Langille & Davidov,ibid; Adelle Blackett & Colleen Sheppard, “Collective Bargaining and
Equality: Making Connections” (2003) 142:4 Int’l Lab Rev 419 at 422-27.
147. See Diamond Ashiagbor, “Unravelling the Embedded Liberal Bargain: Labour and Social
Welfare Law in the Context of EU Market Integration” (2013) 19:3 Eur LJ 303 at 308-10;
David M Trubek & James S Mosher, “New Governance, Employment Policy, and the
European Social Model” in Jonathan Zeitlin & David M Trubek, eds, Governing Work
and Welfare in a New Economy: European and American Experiments (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003) 33 at 35.
148. See Adelle Blackett, “Beyond Standard Setting: A Study of ILO Technical Cooperation
on Regional Labor Law Reform in West and Central Africa” (2011) 32 Comp Lab L &
Pol’y J 443 at 461-64; Alvaro Santos, “Labor Flexibility, Legal Reform, and Economic
Development” (2009) 50 Va J Intl L 43 at 68-73 [Santos]; see generally Tzehainesh Teklé,
Labour Law and Worker Protection in Developing Countries (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2010).
149. Klare, supra note 10.
150. See Kerry Rittich, “Fragmented Work and Multi-level Labour Market Governance:
Informality, Crisis Policy and an Expanded ‘Law of Work’” in de Búrca, Kilpatrick & Scott,
supra note 24 at 185.
151. See the work cited in supra note 27.
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seriously address these projects and the extent to which they might put a brake on
redistributive projects, an endeavor for which there already exists a solid repertoire
of critical legal analyses (hint: I think economy efciency concerns are sometimes
legitimate but very often overblown).152 However, such an intellectual adventure
seems well worth the risk if, in this new economy, we are to have a legality that
can carry forward our wildest longings for redistribution and solidarity.

152. See generally Santos, supra note 148; Duncan Kennedy, “Cost-Beneft Analysis of
Entitlement Problems: A Critique” 33:3 Stan L Rev 387 (1981); Nicholas Mercuro & Steven
G Medema, Economics and the Law: From Posner to Post-Modernism (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997); Kerry Rittich, Recharacterizing Restructuring: Law, Distribution and
Gender in Market Reform (Te Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002).

